


How to plant Orthogonal Vectors?

David Kühnemann





Adam Polak







Alon Rosen

















no orthogonal vectors (w.h.p.)









- ▶ **I know** where the orthogonal vectors are;
- ▶ but **you don't**
...unless you spend n^2 time to find them;
- ▶ construction has some **nice properties**.

Why study planted problems?



Interesting theory



Fine-grained cryptography

Why study planted problems?



Interesting theory



Fine-grained cryptography

Cryptographers: “Give us a problem for which we can **efficiently** generate **hard** instances with **known solutions**, like integer factorization, discrete logairthm, k-SUM, Zero-k-Clique.”

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Orthogonal Vectors

Input: Two sets $U, V \subseteq \{0, 1\}^d$ of n binary vectors of dimension d

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Worst-case complexity:

- ▶ Naive: $O(n^2 d)$
- ▶ Polynomial method: $O(n^{2-1/\log c})$ for $d = c \log n$ [Abboud–Williams–Yu 2014]
[Chan–Williams 2016]
- ▶ Under SETH, requires time $n^{2-o(1)}$ for $d = \omega(\log n)$ [Williams 2005]

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Average-case complexity (i.i.d. p -biased vector entries, $d = c \log n$, $p = \Theta(1/\sqrt{c})$)

- ▶ Just look for sparse vectors: $O(n^{2-1/\log c})$ [Kane–Williams 2019]
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2-Orthogonal Vectors

Input: **Two** sets $U, V \subseteq \{0, 1\}^d$ of n binary vectors of dimension d

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k-Orthogonal Vectors

Input: k sets $U_1, U_2, \dots, U_k \subseteq \{0, 1\}^d$ of n binary vectors of dimension d

Output: Do there exist $u_1 \in U_1, u_2 \in U_2, \dots, u_k \in U_k$ such that

$$\forall i \in [d] \ u_1[i] = 0 \vee u_2[i] = 0 \vee \dots \vee u_k[i] = 0?$$

Worst-case complexity:

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**How to plant orthogonal vectors
so that they are hard to find?**

The Planted k -Orthogonal Vectors Problem

Model distribution: i.i.d. p -biased entries

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Planted distribution: any $k' \leq k - 1$ vectors have **model marginal distribution**



“(k-1)-wise independence”; trivial, e.g., in k-SUM

How to generate k orthogonal vectors to plant?

For each coordinate independently, pick **#ones** according to

$$\Pr[\text{\#ones} = m] = \binom{k}{m} \cdot \left(p^m \cdot (1 - p)^{k-m} - (-1)^{k-m} \cdot p^k \right)$$

and pick locations of m ones uniformly at random from $\binom{k}{m}$ options.

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Example ($k = 2$):

$$\Pr[\mathbf{00}] = 1 - 2p \quad \Pr[\mathbf{01}] = p \quad \Pr[\mathbf{10}] = p \quad \Pr[\mathbf{11}] = 0$$

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Claim: For any $k-1$ out of those k vectors, for any coordinate, we have

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Proof: Just do the math.

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How to generate k orthogonal vectors to plant?

conveniently

► Generate $k - 1$ i.i.d. p -biased vectors $u_1, u_2, \dots, u_{k-1}$

► For each coordinate $i \in [d]$

#ones among first $k - 1$ vectors

► $\ell := u_1[i] + u_2[i] + \dots + u_{k-1}[i]$

► Set $u_k[i] := \begin{cases} 1 & \text{with probability } p \cdot \left(1 - \left(\frac{-p}{1-p}\right)^{k-1-\ell}\right) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$

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Search-to-decision reduction

A **decision algorithm** gets an instance drawn either from the **model distribution** or the **planted distribution** and outputs which one it was

A **search algorithm** gets an instance drawn from the **planted distribution** and outputs indices of the planted vectors

Theorem: If there is a $T(n)$ -time **decision algorithm** for k-OV with success probability $1 - p(n)$, then there is an $O(T(n) \log n)$ -time **search algorithm** for k-OV with success probability $1 - k \log(n)p(n)$

Search-to-decision reduction

Key idea:

- ▶ **Replace some vectors** in the input instance with i.i.d. p -biased vectors
- ▶ If **none of the planted vectors** got replaced, the instance is distributed according to the **planted distribution**
- ▶ If **at least one planted vector** got replaced, the instance is distributed according to the **model distribution**

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Reduction: Use the key idea to implement **binary search**

A different search-to-decision reduction

Theorem

[Agrawal et al., CRYPTO'24]

For every $\delta > 0$ there exists $\epsilon > 0$ such that
if there is a $T(n)$ -time **decision algorithm** for k -SUM with success probability $1 - \epsilon$,
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Search algorithm:

- ▶ Create a **counter** for each vector, initially set to 0
- ▶ **Repeat** $O(\log n)$ times:
 - ▶ **Replace** a random $1 - \sqrt[k]{1/2}$ fraction of vectors with freshly sampled ones
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- ▶ Return the k vectors with **highest counters**

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Proof of correctness: “Just” do the math (~ 3 pages of math)

Summary

- ▶ We show how to sample k orthogonal vectors so that any $k - 1$ of them look like i.i.d. p -biased vectors
- ▶ We conjecture it takes time $n^{k-o(1)}$ to find them among i.i.d. p -biased vectors



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- ▶ Build **public-key cryptography** based on hardness of k -OV
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THANK YOU!